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were put in said warehouse upon the agreement and understanding
that the defendant should not be liable for a loss by accidental fire,
was clearly made out. Such being the case, the common-law liability is limited by this special agreement.
When such is the case, there is no rule of law or principle of
public policy, that forbids the enforcement of the restricted liability.
Judgments of the Common Pleas and District Court reversed
and cause remanded.
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Action against Strangers to Lease.-Recovery for the use and occupation of leased premises cannot be had against others than the lessees
during the term of the lease, if it has not been assigned or the lessees
discharged from liability, or if they have not surrendered their interest,
or known or assented to any new lease that may have been made to the
others: Doty v. Gillett, 43 Mich.
Abandonment or surrender of interests in real estate cannot be inferred from non-user alone: Id.
Where an action for use and occupation was brought against one of
the original lessees and a stranger to the lease, and supported by evidence that the defendants acted as copartners, the latter may show
their actual relation, and the contract between them may be put in evidence. They may also show that the stranger had agreed to pay what
would have been his proportion of the rent under the lease to his codefendant: Id.
ADMIRALTY.

Collision-Duty of Vessel entering Harbor-Negligencenot Presumed
-Duty/ of Libellant to show exercise of care on his own part.I Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions
filed during Oct. Term 1880. The cases will probably be reported in 12 or 13 Otto.
2 From Hon. N. L. Freeman, Reporter; to appear in 98 Illinois Reports.
S From Hon. Frank McGloin, Reporter; to appear in vol. 1 of his Reports.
4 From Henry A. Chaney, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 43 Mich. Reports.
5 From Thomas K. Skinker, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 72 Mo. Reports.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

411

While it is the duty of a vessel entering a harbor on a stormy night, to
proceed to her anchorage with the greatest care and circumspection,
yet, upon a libel against her for collision, a failure to perform such
duty will not be presumed but must be shown by libellant: Shepherd
v. The Schooner Clara, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1880.
In order to recover, the injured vessel must prove care on its own
part, and where it appears that it kept no watch on deck while at
anchor, and that if it had done so the collision might have been avoided
the libel is properly dismissed; Id.
AGENT.

See Estoppel.

Power of Attorney-Sale on Credit under-Notice to Principal of
his Attorney's act by Recording.-Where a power of attorney for the
sale of land is general, containing no limitation upon the attorney, and
no directions as to whether the sale shall be for cash or on time, it will
be in the discretion of the attorney to make sales according to the
usual custom in such matters, and a sale on credit, made in good faith,
by such attorney will be upheld : Silverman v. Bullock, 98 Ills.
Where an agent, under a power of attorney, sells and conveys lots of
his principal on time, taking mortgages and trust deeds on the same to
secure the purchase-money, which he places upon record, the principal
will be held to have notice of what the record of the mortgages and
trust deeds discloses, and he cannot be heard to deny notice of the fact
that his agent has sold on credit and taken notes payable to himself: Id.
Where an agent, under a power of attorney, fraudulently sells and
conveys lots of his principal to a third person, who gives his notes for
the price, payable to the agent, secured by mortgage on the property
sold, and the payee transfers the notes to an innocent purchaser, for
value, the original owner of the land cannot have the sale of the lots
set aside as against the rights of the assignee of the notes, and the latter will have the right to enforce the security for their payment: Id.
ASSIGNMENT.

See Debtor and Creditor.
ATTORNEY.

41Agents" in Courts of Record must be Attorneys.-Disbarred attoraeys can no longer appear as attorneys in any court of record in this
state, nor represent any person in court as attorney, agent, or otherwise: Cobb v. Judge of the Superior Court of Grand Rapids, 43 Mich.
A party cannot appear in a court of record by an agent who is not an
attorney duly licensed to practice: Id.
BILLS AND NOTES.

Payment-Effect of giving a Promissory Note.-The giving of a
promissory note for a pre.existing-debt, whether sealed or unsealed, does
not pay or discharge the original debt unless it be agreed that the note
shall be accepted as payment and satisfaction-and, in the absence of
such an agreement, assumpsit may be maintained for the original debt
if the note be produced on the trial to be cancelled: Walsh v. Lennon,
98 Ill.
Promissory Note-Signature-Bona Fide Holder.-The addition
I Vestryman, Grace Church," to each of the names attached to a pro-
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missory note does not make it anything but the note of the individuals
iden v.
signing it, if it does not purport to bind the corporation:
Barnard,43 Mich.
Where the cashier of a bank is one of the makers and payees of a
note, the bank cannot take it as a bonafide holder without notice : Id.
A finding that a note was transferred before maturity for a valuable
consideration and that at the time the transferee had no knowledge of
the details of its origin, cannot be regarded as equivalent to a finding
that he was a bonafide holder for value: Id.
BRIBERY.
Bribery of the Public by Candidatefor Office.-It is unlawful for a
candidate for public office to make offers to the voters to perform the
duties of the office, if elected, for less than the legal fees. An election
6ecured by means of such offers is void: State ex rel. Attorney-General
v. Collier, 7 2 Mo.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw.

Impairing Obligation of Contracts-Powerof Legislature to reguire
Judgments against a City to be Registered.-Whatever legislation lessens the efficacy of the means provided by law for the enforcement of
a contract, impairs its obligation. But a statute requiring judgments
against a city to be registered with the controller before payment, does
not impede the collection of the judgment and is not unconstitutional:
State of Louisville v. Yty of New Orleans, S. C. U. S., October Term

1880.
Sipreme Court-Jurisdiction- Question as to validity of Bond given
under UnconstitutionalStatute-Stay Law passed by seceding StateValidity of.-When in a suit on a bond the defence is that it is void
because given under a statute which is in violation of the federal constitution, and the state court sustains its validity, the United States
Supreme Court has jurisdiction upon writ of error : Daniels v. Tearney,
S. C. U. S., October Term 1880.
An ordinance passed by the convention of a seceding state immediately after theordinance of secession, and which authorized the sheriff
in all executions, except those in favor of the Commonwealth and against
non-residents, to receive the debtor's bond for the payment of the debt
when the ordinance should cease, impairs the obligation of contracts,
and is, therefore, unconstitutional and void ; Id.
CONTRACT.

Apportionment-Damagesfor Non-Performane.-An express contract to pay a certain sum per thousand for running certain logs, and
for floating a part of them into the main stream, is not divisible and
cannot be apportioned, part to running the logs and part to supplying
the water; and in an action on the contract, the measure of recovery
would be the full contract price as agreed, less any damages from breach
of any part of the contract: Keystone Lumber and Salt Mani 'acturing
Co v. Dole, 43 Mich.
Where a contract is express no provision can be implied: Id.
Failure to perform a contract to furnish water for floating logs is not
excused by an accident whereby the dam was broken, if the contract
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does not provide for accidents, nor if it is a continuing contract and the
dam can be repaired in time for substantial compliance: Id.
CORPORATION.

How Liability as Stockholder may be Assumed-Parol Evidence to
modify Writing.-One may render himself liable as stockholder in a
corporation as well by his conduct in respect to the stock of the corporation, as by formal subscription and acceptance of stock: Griswold
v. Seligman, 72 Mo.
Accordingly, where defendants advanced money to a corporation, and
to secure the advances, received from the corporation a certificate for a
majority of its capital stock, which was absolute and unconditional on
its face, but was to be held by them in trust as declared by a resolution
of the board of directors, or "in escrow," as it was expressed in an
entry on the stock book of the corporation ; and while so holding the
stock, defendants voted it at two elections and thus elected the directors
and other officers, and thereby obtained complete control of the corporation : Held, that they were estopped to deny that they were stockholders, and were liable as such, both to the corporation and its creditors ; and this, so far as the creditors were concerned, whether they became such before defendants had so treated the stock or not-: rd.
NORTON, J., dissenting, denied that there was any liability: Id
HENRY, J., agreed that defendants were liable to creditors, but denied
any liability to the corporation : Id.
Where stock is held under a written contract, as security for advances,
it is not competent to show that there was a verbal understanding that
the bailees were to have the privilege of voting the stock : rd.
Subscription to Stock- What amounts to Failureto deliver Certificate
-Liability of Subscriber.-Inorder to bind a subscriber to the capital
stock of a corporation, it is not necessary that a certificate of the stock
shall be issued to him. All that need be done, so far as creditors are
concerned, is that the subscriber shall have bound himself to become a
contributor to the fund which the capital stock of the corporation represents: Hawley v. Upton, S. C. U. S., October Term 1880.
At the solicitation of an agent of a corporation a person executed a
bond reciting that, in consideration of ten shares of the stock he was
held and firmly bound to pay to the corporation, in instalments, $200,
which was twenty per cent. of the face value of the stock. The bond
recited that the stock was non-assessable. He paid the first instalment
and was entered on the corporation books as a stockholder. He was
also published as a stockholder, though without his knowledge. In a
suit against him by the assignee in bankruptcy of the corporation,
Held, that he was a stockholder and liable to pay for his stock: Id.
COSTS.

Suit against Public Officer-Defendant not liable Personally.-One
sued in his official capacity as escheator for a state and not charged with
any official delinquency, cannot be made liable personally for the costs,
but the judgment for costs should be confined to the funds in his hand
as escheator: Hanenstein v. Lynham, S. C. U. S., October Term 1880.
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COURTS.

Jurisdiction.-Because a law gives a court exclusive jurisdiction in
specified cases, it does not thereby necessarily exclude the court from
all other jurisdiction : Howard v. Lacroix, 1 McGloin.
The law establishing a court is the warrant of its authority, and it
can, in default of subsequent legislation, exercise no powers not thereby
conferred upon it: .d.
Courts of limited authority can entertain no controversy not clearly
within the comprehension of the laws conferring jurisdiction upon
them; and where they do entertain such matters, all orders, decrees and
actions made or had therein are absolutely null and void : Id.
DAMAGES.

See luisance.

When due.-Damages resulting from a failure to observe the conditions of a contract of lease, requiring the lessee to keep and return in
good order the leased premises, are due from the date of demand by
lessor: Bourdette v. Board of School Directors, 1 MlcGloin.
The right to sue for and recover such damages arises ex contractu,
and the prescription applicable to an action arising ex delicto, does not
apply : Id.
D EBTOR AND CREDITOR. See Husband and Wife.
Fraudulent Character of Assignment.-Mere inquiry by a creditor
to ascertain whether it would be more for his advantage to appr,,ve or
contest an assignment made by the debtor, is not dishonest or unreasonable, and is not in itself equivalent to an inducement to others to act
upon it: Hubbard v. McfNaughton, 43 Mich.
The fraudulent character of an assignment does not depend on the
assignor's opinion that what he does is not fraud in law : Id.
An assignment for the benefit of creditors is fraudulent if property
is withheld that should be put into it, and if the assignors give away or
place excessive liens on property that should not be so disposed of: Id.
A general assignment is invalidated by a clause purporting to bind
the creditors to agree to it and to release their claims in full and discharge the assignor from all liabilities as soon as their just proportion of
the proceeds is paid to them. COOLEY, J., dissents : Id.
An insolvent debtor cannot dictate to his creditors terms that shall
make him independent of his legal obligations: Id.
DEED.

Description in Deed-Identity of Lot-Recording Acts.-Where onehalf of block numbered 13 was divided into eight lots 40 feet wide and
116 feet deep, running back to an alley, and lots one and two were subdivided into five lots 23 feet wide and 80 feet deep, running across the
original lots one and two, and the owner of lot four of the sub-division,
on which was a two-story house with a basement, and whose title was of
record, executed a deed of trust to secure a loan of money, in which the
lot was described as lot 4, in block 13, of the addition, "having a frontage of 241 feet, and a depth of 80 feet-one two-story and basement
frame dwelling-house thereon," and it appeared that no such dwellinghouse was on the original lot 4, it was held, the description in the trust
deed was sufficient to render the record of that deed notice to subsequent
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purchasers of lot 4, of the sub-division, and that the description was
sufficient to show that sub-lot 4 was the one conveyed, and not the
original lot 4 : Bowen v. Galloway, 98 Ill.
it is not necessary to the conveyance of any parcel of land that it
shall be called by any particular name, but it will be enough if the description is such as to identify the property. Critical accuracy in the
description is not essential : Id.
Where the description of land in a deed is, by mistake, so defective
that the property cannot be identified, the record of such deed will not
be notice to a subsequent purchaser, and such a deed cannot be reformed
as against a subsequent bonafide purchaser of the property: Id.
EQUITY.

Lien upon two Funds- When one of them must befirst exhausted.It is a rule of equity, that where a creditor has a lien upon two funds,
in one of which the debtor has no interest, but has in the other, the
debtor has a right to compel the creditor to exhaust the fund in which
the former has no interest before resorting to that in which he has an
interest. This is subject, however, to the limitation, that if other persons have a superior equity in the fund to whidh the debtor has no
claim, then the rule has no application: Baird v. Jackson, 98 Ills.
Contractof doubtfrl Propriety,not enforceable in Equity-lJunction
to prevent use of Fictitious Vame similar to the name of Complainant.An agreement to admit a person into a medical institute and assist in
the graduation, and granting to hith a diploma, in consideration of such
person abandoning a fictitious name nearly the same as that of the other
party, who was a member of the faculty, is of such doubtful propriety
that equity will not lend its aid to enforce it. The granting of diplomas to students in colleges ought not to be made the subject of private contracts with individual members of the faculty for personal advantage to themselves : Olin v. Bate et aL, 98 Ill.
A bill, by Henry Olin, who was a physician treating diseases of the
eye and ear in the city of Chicago, charged that the defendant Bate had
assumed the fictitious name of Andrew G. or A. G. Olin, and was engaged in practising his profession in the same city, whose business was
treating venereal diseases, and that in such name he advertised extensively, both in the newspapers and by publications and pamphlets
largely circulated, by which means the complainant's reputation was inIt appeared that the
jured, many taking him for. the defendant.
defendant had been practising in the city under the same name before
the complainant came there. The bill sought to enjoin the defendant
from the use of the name Olin. On the hearing the bill was dismissed:
Meld, that the bill was properly dismissed, for want of equity: Id.
ERRORS AND APPEALS.

Refusal to give Instructionsasked- When not ground for Reversal.When the instruction given by the court to the jury was correct and
was sufficient for the case, the appellate court will not reverse for a failure to give other instructions asked for, even though the latter instructions would have been also correct: Recknagle v. Murphy, S. 0. U. S.,
October Term 1880.
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Refusa( of Writ of Error by State Court-Review of by United
States Supreme Court-Enforcement of Decree of latter Court.-Whenever the highest court of a state by any form of decision affirms or denies the validity of a judgment of an inferior court over which it has
appellate authority, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United
States to review such decision, if it involve a federal question, will
attach. It makes no difference whether the decision of the state court
be expressed by refusing a writ of error or by dismissing one previously
allowed : Williams v. Bruffry, S. C. U. S, October Term 1880.
In such case, if the United States Supreme Court reverses the decision
of the state appellate court, it may enforce its judgment by issuing a
mandate to the state appellate court, or by directly reversing the judgment of the inferior state court and entering judgment in favor of the
party entitled thereto; Id.
ESTOPPEL.

Bond given by Execution-Debtorunder Unconstitutional Statute-Enforcement of.-Although a bond given by an execution-debtor under
the provisions of a stay law passed by a convention of a seceding state
and impairing the obligation of contracts be void on account of the unconstitutionality of the law under which it was given, yet the obligor
who has availed himself of the benefit of that law is estopped in an
action on the bond, from setting up its invalidity: Daniels v. Tearney,
S. C. U. S., October Term 1880.
By Acts misleading Others.-Where a party permits his name to be
affixed over the place of business of another, he holds himself out to
the world as proprietor, and persons dealing with the true owner, not
aware of his interest, and giving credit to the apparent owner, can hold
the latter: Lochte v. Gele, 1 McGloin.
Men have the right to suppose that their neighbors will speak and
act the truth, and to transact their business accordingly: Id.
Representations binding by way of estoppel may be by actions as well
as words: Id.
When a person conducts a certain business, to which the services of
clerks and of a superintendent or manager is essential, and he does not
himself act as such manager, there is a representation that the parties
actually engaged in the performance of these essential duties are his
agents with necessary powers: Id.
A person, however, who gives the exclusive credit to a disclosed agent,
apparent or real, cannot hold the principal: Id. .
The manner of charging upon the books of a merchant, in such a ease
as this, furnishes primafacie evidence as to the placing of the credit:
Id.
EVIDENCE. See Husband and Wife; Telegraph.
Books of Account.-At common law, when the clerk who made
the entries has no knowledge of the correctness of the same, but
made them as the items were furnished by another, it was essential that
the person furnishing the items should testify to their correctness, or
that satisfactory proof thereof, such as the transactions are reasonably
susceptible of from other sources, should be produced: Stettauer v.
White, 98 Ill.
In an action against a defendant for a breach of a contract to buy an
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acount of the plaintiff on a corporation, the plaintiff is bound to prove
his account by proper and legitimate evidence, the same as in a suit
upon the account itself. In such suit the testimony relied on to render
the plaintiff's books competent was that of the bookkeeper, and the
amount claimed appeared upon the ledger, the entries being in his handwriting, and that of a witness who testified that the sales-book produced
contained the original entries, and that the entries were in his handwriting, made in the ordinary course of business, of goods that were
reported as being sold. The entries showed the amount as claimed and
as appearing upon the ledger. He also testified that the goods were
brought into the packing-room and there assorted by a man employed
for that purpose who called them off to the witness as entry clerk, who
made the entries of them in the book as they appeared, and that the
entries were then compared with the goods, when the goods were packed
and shipped, but that he had no personal knowledge of the sale or delivery of the goods. One of the plaintiffs testified that the original
entries of goods sold were made in the sales-book produced, and their
books were fairly and honestly kept, in the usual course of business.
Evidence was also offered of the carrier's shipping-receipt for the transportation of the goods: Reld, that the books were not admissible under
this proof: Id.
Certificate of Acknowledgment- Of Evidence to overcome the Effect
thereof.-Nothing short of clear and satisfactory proof, convincing beyond a reasonable doubt, can overcome the proof of the execution of
a deed, afforded by the certificate of its acknowledgment. The testimony of the grantor alone is not sufficient: Baird et al. v. Jacson, 98
Ills.
The acts and conduct of a party claiming a deed purporting to have
been made by him is a forgery, before he had knowledge of said deed,
can have no bearing on the question as to its genuineness, and can not
be used to contradict his testimony that the deed is not his: Id.
A deed purporting to have been executed by two persons, brother and
sister, to another brother, and purporting to convey the interest of the
grantors in premises of which the three were tenants in common, was
claimed by both the grantors to be a forgery. It was considered that
proof that the pretended deed was a forgery as to one of the grantors,
would raise a strong presumption that it was also a forgery as to the
other. The joint execution of the deed in the form it was made, was
essential to its validity, so proof of the forgery as to one, was of the res
gestm, and tended to shed light on the whole transaction: Id.
F resumptionfrom Neglect to Testify.-Where a bill is filed in aid of
execution, and the question at issue is the good faith of a transfer of the
land, and the purchaser is made a party defendant, and evidence is
given tending to show that the sale was made with an evident intent to
defraud creditors, his neglect to make an affirmative showing to support the sale will warrant a court in giving their full force to any legitimate inferences drawn from the evidence given against it: Whitney v.
Rose, 43 Mich.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

FraudulentConveyance-Made before Lien attacles-May be avoided"
-Evidence.-The fact that at the time a conveyance is made to the
VOL. XXIX.-53

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

debtor's wife, the creditor's judgment was no lien on the land by reason
of no execution having been issued thereon within a year, will not prevent the creditor, after the revival of his judgment and suing out an
execution, from questioning the bondfides of the transaction. If the
debtor paid for the land, and had the title made to his wife in fraud of
the rights of the creditor, the land may be reached in equity by the
creditor : Bennett et al. v. Stout et al., 98 Ills.
The case of Newman v. Willetts, 52 Ill. 98, is not to be understood as
announcing a different doctrine. That case holds, and was only intended
to hold, that where a bill is filed in aid of an execution, the judgment on
which the execution was issued must be, at the time of filing the bill, a
lien on the land sought to be subjected to its payment. What was said
in respect to the necessity of the existence of a lien in order that the
creditor might have his remedy, must be taken as applicable only to the
facts of that case: Id.
The fact that a wife, living with her husband, employs him as her
agent, to cultivate her farm, keep it in repair, have the grain harvested,
stored and sold, is not evidence that the property belongs to the husband,
nor does such an agency convert the products of the farm to the husband, or render them liable for his debts: Id.
On bill to set aside a conveyance of land to a wife by a creditor of her
husband, on the ground that the latter bought and paid for the property,
and had the title made to his wife to defraud his creditors, the declarations of the husband and others, made when the wife was not present,
and without her assent, are not admissible to affect her rights. The
same rule applies to declarations of her grantor. They can not be received to defeat her title: Id.
Married Women-Engaging in Business-Emloyment of Husband
as Clerk.-Under the law of Illinois a married woman may own her
separate estate, and may invest any funds she may have in business
without thereby subjecting her property so invested to the payment of
her husband's debts. She may employ her husband as a clerk and to
assist in conducting the business as any other person, and will not
thereby lose her right of property as against his creditors: Czubberly v.
Scott et aL., 98 Ills.
INFANT.

See Railroad.

INSURANCE.
Vacancy of Premises.-A clause avoiding an insurance policy in case
the premises should "become vacant or unoccupied," did not apply
where a man and his family left home for twelve days to visit a sick
daughter, and engaged a person to go to the house daily to look after
it: Stupetski v. TransatlanticFireIns. Co., 43 Mich.
It would be burglary to break into, and arson to burn a house, during
the temporary absence of the occupants: Id.
LUNATIC.
Contract of Person of Unsound Mind.-An exchange of property
made by a person of mind so unsound, that the want of mental capacity
is apparent to any one of ordinary prudence and observation conversing
with him, is of no validity. A guardian subsequently appointed may
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recover the property of the insane person without tendering back that
received by him in the exchange: Haley v. Troester, 72 Ills.
MASTER AND SERVANT.

See Railroad.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.

Issue of Bonds .Fraudulentlyantedated to avoid Statute-Right of
Purchaser to a return of his Money-Power to borrow Money- When
not Repealed by Subsequent Legislation.-The charter of a city authorized it to borrow money at a rate not exceeding ten per cent. A
subsequent statute directed the registration of all bonds thereafter
issued by municipalities, and provided for the refunding of municipal
debts by the issue of such bonds after a vote of the qualified voters.
The city subsequently issued bonds fraudulently antedated to evade the
registration statute, and sold them in open market through a broker not
ostensibly its agent. Held, that although the bonds were invalid, a
bona fide purchaser, without notice, could recover from the city the
purchase-money, as if it had been directly borrowed by the city.
Heldfurther, that the fact that the sale of the bonds involved an obligation to pay more than ten per cent. interest did not relieve the city
from liability to return the money, since the bonds being invalid the
only contract made was the one justified by law, viz. : to return the
money.
fieldfurther, that the general power to borrow money conferred by
the charter was not repealed by the statute providing for the refunding
of its debt and the issue of registered bonds; City of Louisiana v.
Wood, S. C. U. S., October Term 1880.
NAME. See Equity.
Change in Name of Paper pending Publication of ForeclosureNotice.-A change of name does not necessarily destroy identity so long
as that to which the name pertains remains the same: Perkinsv. Keller,
43 Mich.
A statutory foreclosure is not invalidated by a change in the name
of the newspaper in which the foreclosure advertisement is published,
and by the removal of the publication office to another place in the same
county, if the paper otherwise preserved its identity: Id.
NATIONAL BANKS.

Dealings beyond their CorporatePowers.-The maker of a non-negotiable note discounted with a national bank cannot question the right
of the bank to recover on it, on the ground that national banks have no
right to deal in that kind of paper: Rirst National Bank of Trenton
v. Gillilan, 72 Mo.
NEGLIGENCE.

See Railroad.

NUISANCE.

Private Nu3sance-Damages.-Where the owner knowingly permits
" brothel to be established and maintained in his house, which adjoins
a tenement of another, by reason of which the latter's tenants leave,
and his property is depreciated in value, the former is liable to the
latter for the special damage thereby caused him, over and above the
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wrong and injury done to the general public: Givens v. Van Studdiford,
72 Mo.
In such a case the measure of damages is the difference in the selling
value of the property and the loss of rent occasioned by such nuisance:
Id.
In ascertaining these facts, all circumstances that would show a depreciation in value should be considered, and the damage recovered
must be the actual depreciation shown to be caused by the existence of
the nuisance: Id.
Where it is shown that, after defendant's house was occupied as a
brothel, other houses of the same character were opened in the neighborhood, so that the damage caused by others cannot be separated from
that caused by defendant, he will be liable for all such damage, if the
natural and probable consequence of his illegal act was to cause the
injury complained of: Id.
OFFIOE.

See Bribery.

PARTNERSHIP.

Partnership-Actsof one Partner as binding upon the F'rm.-One
partner has not the power to bind the other members of the firm by
deed without other authority: Walsh v. Lennon, 98 Ills.
It is, however, within the power of a partner in the mercantile business to borrow money in the name of the firm, and to bind the firm by
an agreement to pay interest on the same at any lawful rate, and to
sign the firm-name to any writing admitting the fact of borrowing and
promising to pay, and thereby furnish evidence against the firm and
each of its members: Id.
In assumpsit against the members of a firm, a note under seal, signed
in the firm-name by one of the partners, reciting that it was given for
money borrowed, and promising to pay ten per cent. interest, is admissible under the common counts, and a recovery may be had of both
principal and interest on producing the note on the trial to be cancelled.
In such case the seal adds nothing to the force and effect of the instrument as an admission of the loan, and of the interest agreed to
be paid: Id.
PLEADING.

Distinction between Want and Failureof Consideration-Burdenof
Proof.-As a matter of pleading there is a distinction between the
pleas of a want of consideration and a failure of consideration; the latter necessarily admits the original existence of a consideration, and in
all cases involves an assumption of the burden of proof: Denegre v.
Bayly, 1 McGloin.
POSSESSION.

Notice of Occupant's Claim of Title--Equity.-One who has knowledge of the fact that land is in the actual possession of another, is
thereby put upon inquiry as to the rights of the occupant, and if he
purchases, will be held to take with notice of those rights : Martin v.
Jones et al., 72 Mo.
Equity will interfere by injunction in favor of one claiming title to
land through an unrecorded deed, to prevent a sale under a deed of
trust held by one who took it with notice of the plaintiff's claim: Id.
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RAILROAD.

Sale of its Franchises- When immunity from Taxation does not pass
to the Purchaser.-The sale under decree of court of a railroad with its
"1property and franchises," without mentioning its "privileges and immunities," does not pass to the purchaser an immunity of the road
from taxation: Morgan v. Louisiana, 93 U. S. 217, followed; Humphrey v. Pegnes, 16 Wall. 244, distinguished; East Tennessee V. & G.
Railroad Co. v. Hamblen Co., S. C. U. S., October Term 1880.
Negligence-Man on the Track-Engineer'sDuty.-An engineer in
charge of a moving train has a right to assume that persons past the
age of childhood will heed the usual alarm signals. If, after giving
such signals without effect, he uses such means as in his judgment are,
in the emergency, most advisable to prevent collision with a person
standing on the track, he is not chargeable with negligence, and the
company cannot. be held liable for the consequences of a collision, although he failed to use other means which were at hand, provided he
is competent and experienced in his business: Bell v. The Hannibal
& St. Joseph Railroad Co., 72 Mo.
In this instance, the engineer applied the air-brakes to the train, but
did not attempt to reverse the engine: Id.
The mere fact that a train was moving at a dangerous rate of speed,
will not make the company liable for injuries to a person run over by the
engine, if he was himself guilty of contributory negligence: id.
When Free Rider on Freight Drain to be regardedas a Passenger-Liability for Torts of Servant.-It seems that a person riding on a freight
train on which passengers are allowed to be carried, is to be regarded as
a passenger, although he may have boarded the train without the knowledge or permission of the conductor and paid no fare, if the conductor,
after becoming aware of his presence, permits him to remain: Sherman
v. St. Joseph Railroad Co., 72 Mich.
It is well settled that to make the master liable for the tortious act of
his servant, the act causing injury must have been in the line of his servant's duty and within the scope of his employment. Upon this principle, where the conductor had exclusive control of a railroad train and
of all persons on it, but a brakeman, nevertheless, without the knowledge
of the conductor, assumed to direct a boy on the train to perform a certain service, and in the attempt to comply with the order the boy was
injured: Held, that the railroad company was not liable: rd.
The youth of a person injured on a railroad train may excuse him
from concurring negligence, but it cannot supply the place of negligence
on the part of the company, or extend the liability of the company for
tortious acts of its servants: id.
If a passenger on a freight train is injured while simply riding on a
freight car by reason of an accident to the train, the company will be
liable if the rule prohibiting passengers from riding elsewhere than in
the caboose is not conspicuously posted as required by law; but it is
otherwise if the injury is the result of an attempt on his part to perform an unauthorized service for the company: Id.
RECORDING ACTS.

See Deed.
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SHIPPING.

Bail for Release of Vessel-Power of Ship's Husband to bind Coowners.-Part-owners of a vessel are by construction of law, parties to
any proceedings in rem against her, and are entitled to intervene actively and contest its liability, the extent of the claims against it, and
the validity of its seizure and detention: IMitchell v. Chambers, 43
Mich.
Judgments against a vessel on a claim against her, and against her
managing owner and the surety upon a recognisance for her release from
detention, are part of a general adjudication of the liability: Id.
The several part-owners of a vessel are usually co-tenants, not partners,
and will not be regarded as partners unless it distinctly appears that
they are so: Id.
A vessel-master has no authority as such to find bail for the ship in
behalf of the owners: I'd.
The ship's husband cannot bind co-owners by obtaining bail to release
the vessel from seizure on civil process if the co-owners themselves were
not personally liable, and neither authorized him to obtain it or acquiesced, and if there was no such emergency as would call for the assumption of personal responsibility: rd.
The assent of vessel-owners to the acts of the ship's husband cannot
be implied from their silence except as to such acts as are fairly appropriate to occasions with which he is usually allowed to deal: Id.
Co-owners of a vessel are not personally liable on claims incurred by
it before they acquired their interest: Id.
The necessity for obtaining the release of a vessel from seizure does
not necessarily imply that the release was obtained on such conditions
as to bind owners personally: Id.
It seems that a ship's husband is not warranted in assuming extraordinary powers without obtaining authority from the owners if they
can be readily communicated with, as by telegraph: Id.
One who consents to become surety for a party in a legal proceeding
must see to it that he acts on the request of the party himself or his
attorney or agent duly authorized to represent him in that respect; Id.
The interest of the managing owner of a vessel entitles him to act for
himself in obtaining bail for its release from detention, and the bail
cannot hold co-owners personally liable for the security without showing
that they were parties to the transaction : Id.
SURETY.

See Shipping.

STATUTE.

Customs-Laws-Interpretationof Trade Terms.-In the interpretation
of terms used iu the customs-laws, the law recognises the authority of
those engaged in commerce, and adopts necessarily and as conclusive the
meaning which they have given to words and phrases employed in their
daily business: Recknagle v. Murphy, S. C. U. S., October Term 1880.
Statutes derivedfrom other States.-Where a statute of this state is
derived from another state, a decision of the Supreme Court of that
state construing it, rendered after its adoption here, does not carry with
it that authoritative force that it would have had if it had been rendered
before the adoption: Griswold v. Seligman, 72 Mo.
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Object of- Caption.-Where the letter of a statute is doubtful or
ambiguous, the courts are to seek the object the legislature had in view,
and the purposes sought to be accomplished by the enactment: Howard
v. Lacroix, 1 McGloin.
Although the caption of a statute cannot control its text, yet, if the
latter be ambiguous, the caption furnishes the best guide as to the objects and purposes of the law: .d.
SUNDAY.

Works of Necessity and Charity-Subscriptions taken in Church on
Sunday to pay Church Expenses-Whether work done on Sunday is
within the exception to the Sunday law as a work of necessity or charity,
is purely a question of law and statutory construction, and depends in
all cases upon the intent of thestatute: Allen v. Duffle, 43 Mich.
Where a rule of law is in accord with the finding of a jury the verdict
may be allowed to stand, even though the question was improperly left
to them: Id.
Mere convenience of time and opportunity cannot be the test as to
whether work done on Sunday is work of necessity : Id.
All the necessary and usual work connected with religious worship
is work of charity. Religious societies are formed to do good to mankind, and charity is active goodness: Id.
Raising subscriptions from a congregation on Sunday to pay off a
church debt or purchase a house of worship, is a work of charity within
the exception to Comp. L., sect. 1984, which prohibits Sunday business: Id.
The support of public worship is a work of charity that may properly
be done on Sunday, and subscriptions taken for that purpose from a
congregation assembled for religious exercises on the Sabbath may be
sustained: Id.
TAXATION.

See Railroad.

TELEGRAPH.

Compulsory Productionof Telegraphic Dispatches in Court-Liabiity
of Company's Agent to Punishmentfor Refusal.-Telegraphic messages
in the possession of the officers of the company are not privileged communications. No act of Congress puts them on the same footing with
the mails; and no statute of Missouri or principle of law gives them
any different standing from that occupied by any communication made
by one through another to a third party, with respect to the liability of
the confidant to be called as a witness to produce it or testify to it. The
agent of a telegraph company may, therefore, be compelled by proper
process to produce such messages before the grand jury; and no rule of
the company can excuse him from liability to punishment for refusal so
to do : Ex parte Brown, 72 Mo.
A subpoena duces tecumn to compel the production of telegraphic dispatches should give a reasonably accurate description of the papers
wanted, either by date, title, substance or the subject to which they
relate. The following description is not sufficiently certain : Dispatches
.between Dr. J. C. Nidelet and A. B. Wakefield, and William Ladd and
J. C. Nidelet, and William Ladd and Dr. Nidelet; between Warren
McChesney and A. B. Wakefield: between Warren McChesney and J.
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0. Nidelet; between the latter and John S. Phelps; between A. B.
Wakefield and John S. Phelps; between the latter and William Ladd,
and between George W. Anderson and A. B. Wakefield, sent or received
by or between any or all of said parties within fifteen months last past:
Id.
TENANT IN COMMON.

Contribution-Asbetween Tenants in Common for Improvements, etc.
It is a familiar and elementary rule, that where a tenant in common
makes necessary repairs on the property, necessarily purchases an incumbrance or outstanding title, or improves the property with the
express or implied assent of his co-tenants, these all inure to the
benefit of all the tenants, and the law requires each to contribute to the
expense in proportion to his interest in the property: Bairdv. Jackson,
98 Ills.
Where one tenant in common had given his express assent to the
erection of buildings by his co-tenant upon premises held by them, even
though there then existed what purported to be a conveyance from the
tenant so assenting, to his co-tenant, of the interest of the former in the
premises, of which he at the time had no knowledge, and which proved to
be a forgery, it was held, the tenant so assenting to the making of the
improvements, having held his co-tenant, the grantee in the forged deed,
out to the world as the sole owner, by superintending the construction
of the buildings, and by other acts, will be estopped to claim that his
interest in the property shall not be liable for its proportionate share of
the cost of the improvements: .d.
All improvements placed on real estate by the owner while it is incumbered inures to the benefit of the holder of the incumbrance, and
against the lien when they savor of the
their value cannot be claimed
to it: Id.
realty, but are subject
So, where one tenant in common, by the express consent of his cotenant, places valuable buildings on the common property, and thereby
acquires a lien on his co-tenant's interest for a proportionate share of
the cost of the improvement, it will be an accession to his interest, which
will be subject to a deed of trust given by him on the property, and it
will pass to the trustee to the same extent, in the same manner, and for
the same reasons that the improvements became liable to the lien of the
trust deed: Id.
UNITED STATES.

Charter of Vessel for War Service-lnjury from Disobedience of
Orders by the Master not a War Risk- Voluntary Payment.-Where a
vessel is chartered for war service, an injury resulting from disobedience
by the master of the orders of the commanding military officer is not
a war risk for which the government is responsible, but a marine risk
which the owner assumes: White v. United States, S. C. U. S., October
Term 1880.
Where money is voluntarily paid with a full knowledge of the facts,
the fact that it was paid to avoid a controversy with the United States
is no ground for recovery against the latter : Id.
VOLUNTARY PAYMENT.

See United States.

